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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COLLIN L. HANSEN, the duly appointed, 
acting and qualified administrator of 
the estate of Bernard Hansen, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN, the duly appointed 
and acting and qualified administratrix 
of the estate of Arnold Christensen, 
deceased and DELLA A. CHRISTENSEN, 
individually, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14112 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE: 
This is an appeal from a decision and order of the 
First Judicial District Court ordering the defendant to 
convey by warranty deed a parcel of land sold to the plain-
tiffs under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
The case was tried before the Court sitting without a 
jury. The Court found that the defendants had failed to 
give the plaintiffs notice of default and reasonable amount of 
1 
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time in which to remedy the default, and that a full and 
complete tender of the contract price had been made and 
therefore the defendant was ordered to convey the land to 
the plaintiff by warranty deed, the plaintiff was awarded 
attorneys fees and defendant was awarded the cashier's check 
in the amount of $2,422.02. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent requests that this Court sustain 
the District Court's decision and judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On approximately January 17, 1958, Arnold Christensen 
and Delia A. Christensen, his wife, hereinafter referred to 
as the sellers, sold a tract of land to Bernard Hansen herein-
after referred to as the buyer. The land was sold under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (see PI. Ex. 1). The buyer paid 
$1,200.00 down (see PI. Ex. 1 and PI. Ex. 5, receipt dated Jan. 
17, 1958), the contract provided that the next payment was to 
have been made on January 1, 1959. This payment was made on 
September 8, 1959 when $900.00 principal and $168.00 interest 
was paid (see PI. Ex. 5, receipt dated Sept. 8, 1959) by the 
buyer to Delia Christensen. 
Arnold Christensen, one of the sellers died on July 1, 
1958, and Bernard Hansen, the buyer, died on October 13, 1960. (T.7) 
No payments were made from September 8, 1959 until a tender 
2 
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was made on October 31, 1962 and November 1, 1962. 
y * r ne^^ ••'•'' ;:""."f"~ 
During the entire period from execution of the contract 
until October 31, 1962, the Christensens never notified the 
Hansens that they were in default or that they were declaring 
a forfeiture of the contract. (T.4-5) On October 31, 1962, 
Collin L. Hansen, a son of the buyer, went to the home of Delia 
Christensen and there offered to pay the contract in full. (T.7-9) 
At that time notification was given by Delia Christensen and/or 
Mack Christensen, a son of Delia and Arnold, that the contract 
was in default. (T.8-9). On November 1, 1962, a cashier's check 
in the amount of $2,422.02 was left with J. Leo Nelson at the 
First Security Bank of Utah, Brigham City Office, to give to 
Delia Christensen in exchange for deeds for the property, (see 
PI. Ex. 5). 
Delia Christensen testified that had she accepted the 
cashiers check on November 1, 1962, she would have been paid 
in full for all principal, interest and taxes owing on the 
contract. (T.63-65). 
Also, on November 1, 1962, a letter was sent from Walter 
t , '.''j OF Si Oi'f' 
G. Mann, attorney for the Hansens, to Delia Christensen, ad-
vising her that a cashier's check in the amount of $2,422.02 
•:J.Lea ' 
had been left with the First Security Bank of Utah Brigham City 
office, as payment in full of all interest, principal and taxes 
• ^"•';' ;:'o*n Fm.f: 
under the contract and that a deed from the administratrix of 
3 
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the estate of Arnold Christensen would need to be given to-
gether with a deed by Mrs. Christensen. Mrs. Christensen w a s , 
K ,1. •'•- i ' -
also, advised that the deed should be made payable to the 
^u:? • 3VS(, 
administrator of the Hansen estate or to the heirs who were 
I "5:1 SO .. : r:\i. : ;/>(v :•; 
named in the letter. (See Plaintiff's Ex. 2 ) . Mrs. Christensen 
acknowledged receipt of the letter, and had the original letter, 
€>XI^C; ' ;• „-\r,." .iij oj J:-t-
which was admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Ex.2. Mrs. 
\ •« i. , :.',t.w L M , A , i :.••:" • 
Christensen also acknowledged that she had had a telephone con-
:io\bi,-
versation with Mr. J. Leo Nelson, an officer of First Security 
"t O f:<' X;';.." i../' T 11& B i X t« G. 1 O i i C >.. 
Bank of Utah, who indicated that the check was there for her to 
:HOSffo •.-;:• n i «**-•# 
pick up in exchange for the deed (T.61). 
The evidence also disclosed that George Mason, since 
c\' --*. L :i.a ,rl.a:tU ":!o . 
deceased, was acting as attorney for the Christensens and a 
-SOS- , ' . -Q 
memorandum dated July 11, 1963, typed and part of which is in 
the handwriting of Mr. J. Leo Nelson (T.41) shows that the 
.isaneiaxxftD sii 
contract and a letter from Mr. Mann, attorney for the Hansen, 
was given to George Mason to secure a deed, (see PI. Ex. 5, 
.-./.v.o o ::;.ui d'Be:ca:^  
memo dated July 11, 196 3) . Collin Hansen, a son and heir of 
the buyer and spokesman for the family was asked to contact 
isilnW m a n jaee 
Mr. Mason to see about getting a deed to the land (T.12). 
- .. .. . o:j •«, En^snsU 
A deed was never delivered and the cashier's check was 
never picked up by the sellers. 
Y3X'.'. .:•. "Ki i o .,•.;:•% a ya^".?- * " "•*•*••• r - • • • • • • • * f * ^ - •-? 
The buyers had quiet, uninterrupted possession of the 
a ex.? •* ; • •' • is ?• i t x. 3 rt e m v • 
land from 1958 until the law suit was filed and the sellers 
\o xxn^-
never attempted to retake the property. (T.6,15,31,62) until 
after the law suit was filed. 
4 
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The s e l l e r s n~:vor n o t i f i e d t h e b u y e r s chat : t h e ' ; ~ ~-r i 
d e c i ^ " , " i r •. :. :i T;-'••'• :.. •'.•:• i. v- -^oi'i r - ' 1 -v r i l O r - t o b e r '•" - ° 
the date Collin Hansen met with Mrs. Christensen. U-~; 
POINT I • • --- -" --••- . ._— ' 
UTAH LAW DEMANDS THAT BEFORE A PARTY'S ";-^^ -
INTEREST IN A UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CON-,,., 
TRACT CAN BE TERMINATED OR FORFEITED v 
,,. THAT NOTICE BE GIVEN AND THAT A REASON-
:
 ABLE AMOUNT OF TIME BE GIVEN TO A TslJY^R 
IN WHICH TO PAY PAST ARREARAGES. 
I '.^  /-1* >.~J1 *• ,i " ' _. .. vft hpen consider*?^! i^ 
a number •* cr^? "vy -.h?.a ,; .V: State Supreme foui • , " * tV-
case c;t iic.'F-Q owner's --an '."oronr.j- :
 :. .9, -> , i r.v3 ;.., , • '• 
3 5 5 , • ' ' i r ; - ^  ' .-. \o/ '?iie •"•.'ur. w;v; ccnsic^ri/.o :i c • --* 
in w.iiow ". :^ni°" S-/J ^oen ^-KV i*-. a :.iLiurr1 \cai Lstate Contract 
and the court sr";tod: 
lffThe law relative to tender under contractr. 
-^ -f ^Y(!,V which provides that in case of default the 
holder has the option to declare the whol^ ' JL 
?;\ rmB r amount due, is well set fort! 1 i 1: 1 52 \v. J!;r. 
—-—---• 245, Sec, 41, which is as follows: 'Under a '"-f7";: 
contract which provides that any default in 
the payment of the interest or an installment ":;" 
n0r-j-H3jof the principal when due shall give the ob-
B j r ligee an option to declare the whole amount 
,-:c;jr due, the general rule is that a_ tender of 
payment of the overdue principal or interest 
before the option to declare the whole debt 
:, due has been exercised cuts off the right to 
exercise the option» "Stansbury v. Embrey', 
128 Tenn. 103, 158 S. W. 991, 47 L.R.A,N.S., 
980; Weinberg v, Naher, 51 Wash, 591, 99 
P736, 22L.R.A,N.S., 956. This is so because 
the debt does not become due on the "mere de-
I.v, * - fault in payment, but by affirmative action 
by which the creditor makes it known to the 
debtor that he intends to declare the whole 
debt due.1" (emphasis added) 
5 
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.rt.r.:*^n- 7^/^n ?•-*** jr*p.
 srrT 
The Utah Supreme Court in a more recent case Romero v. 
Schmidt 15 Ut2d 300,302,392 P2d 37(1964) reaffirmed the holding 
of the Home Owner1s Loan Corporation case by citing the same 
and further stated; , ,_ . 
"As pointed out supra, the jury and court 
found that a valid tender was made on Oct-
ber 15th and demand was not made until the 
18th of the same month. We therefore hold 
that the trial court ruled properly in hold-
nx bsisl: i-n9 that the valid tender prevented plaintiff 
" f r o m foreclosing on the mortgage and note. 
erij TI Adoption of this construction lends itself 
to the general principles of equity and the :iJn s 
5£3 id I rr- attitude this and other courts have taken 
*—--'toward mortgage foreclosures. The plaintiff — f**-< 
will sustain no damage by the court1s refusing 
to enforce the acceleration clause since he — -
©GBo . B pnJr 
"iohij"ioD .^-tK-fgr will receive the full consideration he bar-
gained for under the uniform real estate :: r 
contract." (emphasis added) 
More recently in the case of Lamont v. Evjen, 29 Utah 
2d 266, 268, 508 P2d 532, (1973) the Utah Supreme Court re-
affirmed the rulings in Home Owner's Loan Corporation and Romero 
and further stated: 
•TO :K3o:r--j.'\h s;-
-de 
3n "In the case of Romero v. Schmidt the question 
of the effect of a tender upon the right of a 
l£C; plaintiff to foreclose pursuant to the option 
~3^|, in a uniform real estate contract was before 
this court. We_ there held that a valid tender 
prevented the plaintiff from foreclosing on the 
contract as a^  note and mortgage. See Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation v. Washington, 108 
Utah 469, 161 P2d 355 (1945); also see 52 Am. 
Jr., Tender, Sec. 41. 
o.i 
1J&L) 
Tpr "Before a seller of land under a uniform real 
6 
e 
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VO.B J 1 S2 HO" 
F r *~* r>. rr r I 
'"'Vt >\ ? 
\1 ;td rf^  i I. 
"I t 
o r 6 U : , O J 
•• ? ^ 'j-' i 
L - . 1 1 ' 
'- sz ,f>^*:-
sis YJ'xr 
a on.he :! 
a on iii^o 
estate contract can exercise any of the 
options given him because of a failure 
on the part of the purchaser to pay an 
installment as promised, he must give 
the purchaser notice of the default and 
a reasonable time in which to bring the 
contract current. The reason for the 
rule is set forth in 52 Am.Jur., Tender, 
Sec.41,as follows: 
....This is so because the debt 
:)S"i;i does not become due on the mere ft 
default in payment, but by affirm-
-'• ' ative action by which the creditor 
makes it known to the debtor that 
^ "" * he intends to declare the whole 
debt due. The creditor is entitled 
'•'•*-' to a reasonable time after default 
in which to exercise the option, but 
the option itself does not outlive 
the default. Such acceleration stip-
'
 :
 ulations should be so construed, if 
possible and consistent with the 
*
>s
 language employed, as to give the f :: ~ 
protection intended thereby to both 
the debtor and the creditor.... 
The rule is especially applicable in cases like 
the instant one where the default was overlooked 
by all parties for some fifteen months. 
"It appears that the plaintiffs failed to 
to establish that they gave notice to the ,,M er 
defendants of their election to treat the 
contract as a note and mortgage prior to a ::; -<r;.. 
full tender of the amount due. Besides, 
the defendants were not given a reasonable 
time in which to make good the delinquent 
installment." (emphasis added) f -.-. 
From these cases a rule of law has consistently been 
.
il£ifollowed..^ >! „^ •••-:. . . - . . : — . —;; ,-,-.,-
This rule is: vf 
I.B9il 
bsd aroliei 
|g,Before a seller of land under a Uniform Real r 
Estate Contract can exercise any of the options 
given him, because of failure on the part of the 
purchaser to pay installments as promised, he 
must give the purchaser notice of default and a 
reasonable time in which to bring the contract 
current." 
7 
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r, I'sf^-"; •:. - f^^} -*. .^.^^^nH ^i'SJpA 
Thus before the Christensens could default or forfeit any 
interest of the Hansens they had to first give the Hansens notice 
and then give them a reasonable amount pf time to bring the contract 
^ - •••• •- -. :\ .IP :-• ::. z Iv* 
current. : - ; - , L I O ' 1 t.s^\ <•> .^-'-l 
From the evidence of the case it is undisputed that the 
._•
 r, J .;. ,.„ ^  ........ , , . . t , 
•-. Aid i v .ti:/j, v , .. ,.„,.,;. ji., 
first time the Christensens notified the Hansens that they were 
declaring a default was on October 31, 1962, at the time when 
Collin HanserTcame to pay off the entire balance on the contract, 
..••• .
 :
«riw a i 
and on that date Collin Hansen offered to pay the contract in full. 
On the next day a cashier's check was drawn and notice give to 
Delia Christensen informing her that the money was available 
upon receipt of the deed necessary to convey the land to the 
Hansens. */\ HKJ J'\ - : ;\« rv':; • :-> *• -l/,(,v;an.i: ^'L: 
Thus there was a valid tender of the contract balance and 
the buyers are entitled to a deed conveying the property in 
\j 
question to them. 
.? lo * 
The sellers in their brief attempt to claim that since 
the buyers first failed to make payments, the buyers cannot 
invoke the equitable remedy of specific performance,-^i 
However, the case cited by the sellers, Fisher v. Johnson 
525 P2d 45 (1974) deals with only an earnest money offer, and 
the case before the court deals with an executed Uniform Real 
Estate Contract that had been partially performed and in which a 
• > . : ' • ; , ' • , • f t 
a full and complete tender for the balance due the sellers had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been made. Thus the cases relied on by the sellers are not 
as directly in point as those dealing with executed, performed 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts. In addition, after the buyers made 
a full and complete tender they cut off any default and under 
equitable principles, they were restored to the status of one 
who had fully complied with all contract requirements, and thus 
were entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance. 
. ,:•* ^ ..'.u* * . . ••• -I: to 
: , : " *' h n O U> . • * • w u ^ tJ.'+, • • 
cn.c-Vc/^.q^ f^J l o ; r ^ * ->*;! •* '*=*•* x -^ ~^,. 'i Ti'itaxBi*! . 
'i ;;j a •...• \-.*c :'•;., . POINT II " ^ "'^m + or ssofc 
"'-pel 
rUNDER UTAH LAW THE ATTEMPT BY COLLIN %3 
"HANSEN TO MAKE PAYMENT ON OCTOBER 31, 5S 
1962, WOULD BE DEEMED TO BE A VALID o.s/li 
TENDER AND IN ADDITION THERETO THE 
, TENDER MADE ON NOVEMBER 1, 1962, WAS "'* 
^A VALID TENDER. ' ' ~ • *:i i'i:?v ::^ ..BJ 
~ ^
:
 • -;''-••..'/.•- '^ S *. '.-^ - c-.eA^-ii 
, o'r-.ro .•'• .'{1: ; o ,;jDf.i ', '• • • * • 
The evidence before the court is that on Halloween 
5xriT 
evening, October 31, 1962, Collin Hansen went to the home 
of Delia Christensen and tried to pay off the contract balance. 
At that time the Christensens refused the offer for payment and 
told Collin Hansen he was in default and the contract was can-
celed. Under Utah law this offer would be deemed to be a tender. 
Romero v. Schmidt, supra, at 301-302, states: J 
o ci.nz o , i.},: .-.-, : ,, 
"The first question to be resolved in 
'- the appeal is whether there was sufficient 
tender. It should be pointed out that the 
""*:' sufficiency of the dishonored check as tender alb 
of delinquency was never raised at trial. 
:!:
 The only issue on appeal is as to the suffi-; nevs 
9 
F 
-iJ 
f n 
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i sea ion sx£ ciency of the phone call from the real estate 
broker to plaintiff on October 15, 1962, of-
bsmiotTsq fering to pay over any existing delinquency upon
 B 
receipt of a verified balance. 
%f
.~sm BTxsyi/d srirt "isji.s ,- - -^-tviO 
"On the issue of tender below, the judge in-
•lebnu b m structed the jury that: -..;..j B:IDICI/HOD irre «%.; ^  
sno ?to 
aurii bns 
*eonj$nrxG:ti,.3cf o 
erj:j&^ 3 »*!••• .Tender as used in these instructions, 
is meant an offer to pay, or the act of 
.airisfiti holding a claim or demand against him, j 
the amount of money which he considers 
and admits to be due in satisfaction of 
such claim or demand, without any stip-
ulation or condition*1 
Plaintiff argues that the act of telephoning 
does not meet the strict requirements of a 
legal tender. 52 AmJr. 215,2 31, Tender, 
Sees. 2 and 24; Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 
2d 351,273 P2d 974 (1954) and cases cited 
therein; U.C.A. 1953, 78-27-1. . ,. ., 
"If the legal sufficiency of the alleged 
tender were in issue, the point plaintiff 
makes would be well taken; but, its suffi-
ciency, according to the facts of this case, 
nsewcis not bound to such strict requirements. 
This court has held that where the unreason-
ematl a able conduct of the obligee would make an 
actual tender a meaningless gesture, an ""offer 
r.q.e.V9 
e o n s Led ir>& t o comply w i t h 
the obligor is" 
the terms of 
sufficient. 
the contract by 
Thomas v. Johnson, 
bns ;tasfrfYBq 
-aBO asw 3z 
55 
v. 
858 
5. 
Evans, et al 
feloi 
"i ana s J- -*rf C; 
Utah 424, 186 P 437 (1919) 
Houtz, et al., 57 Utah 216, 220, 193 P. 
(1950) ;52 Am.Jr. 218, 219, Tender, Sec. 
The findings of fact by the trial court 
adequately substantiate the position that ,baleo 
defendants1 offer to pay all existing de-
linquencies was sufficient to constitute
 7 bisnxoH 
a tender in this case, 
ni 
The rationale of the Romero decision also applies to this 
dispute. When the Christensens refused to accept payment or 
even to discuss the amount to be paid on the contract, Collin 
10 
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provided: 
6 2fiw '^;6i;j "upon final payment of all of the principal ^arteA 
and interest, taxes and assessments herein 
mix^oilol BtU stipulated to be paid by the Grantee, when xi3xra 
the same are due, and upon full performance 
by said Grantee of all of the terms, condi- ., v,-;l 
tions, and provisions of this agreement, then 
IsaoL-tibaoonur
 and in that event the Grantors agree to execute 
and deliver to the Grantee a Warranty Deed 
muB.tz re ,,,nt covering the above described real property." uy^Jo 
(See plaintifffs Ex. 1 paragraph 9) 
•
 Mnex:\:: -^ . *v- - •'-'•> oxb -j ;i;i. -* .*«-*•* ?-.-? -ro.^  •  
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 clearly shows that on November 
yn of- --n set J"a^  • .. • : .  -:\ 
1, 1962, the plaintiff had a cashier's check available as 
payment in full, which the Christensens could pick up at their 
convenience upon delivery of necessary deeds. This letter was 
BOfiBf ..
 t 
acknowledged to have been received by the defendant, Delia 
-rt?:- nz't or?;! r ; - • •.-: 
Christensen, who also acknowledged that had she accepted the 
ex s fo *" i "},'-' ^  
money on that day, she would have been paid in full for all sums 
due her and her husband's estate. Collin Hansen was a person 
7 e C j r
 '1 S i o 81000* 
who, by law, could make a tender as an heir of his father, and 
as a successor in interest to the property, and his offer to 
:
*-"*'
iJ
- " • a-ou-ibhs u i. 
pay on October 31, 1962, and his letter written to Mrs. Christen-
ns
--- 'JasmerxupBi srli .s^sani _ .->•• 
sen and the cashiers check all were valid tenders. 
taeasSB -
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 also shows that the contract and 
the November 1, 1962, letter from Mr. Mann were given to George 
Mason to" secure a deed. This cooroborates the testimony of 
Collin Hansen who testified that the contract was in George 
Mason's office, who was then the attorney for the Christensens, 
and that deeds were supposed to have been prepared. These facts 
would indicate that the tender was acceptable and the Christensens 
s
- would be estopped to deny a valid tender. , 4
 D-j Sl h irur^ajB 
" *
c
'- - M ^ ^ A S * ,:tnsmvha Iztu* -Jjferij pai^sm ax no \£l&i bluco 
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Hansen's "offer to comply with the terms of the contract" was a 
sufficient tender. In addition the tender made on the following 
-• \0:J: ••')-;,- :..\c.o &<\3 
day was also a legal tender. ix> "io ^e^npri:.: hi.&z \d 
"" ' ' * - -. ~ %-f 
e: Generally speaking "tender" is defined as an "unconditional 
offer of payment consisting in the actual production... of a sum 
' '• x^x x 
not less than the amount due on a specific debt or obligation". 
(See 74 Am.Jr. 2d Tender Sec. 1 ) . The tender "must be made by 
the obligor.... or by one who is authorized in fact or in law 
•>r r c**i, 
.4. .*. .^*,... ,- -.
 nnr» v n:i 
to do so." (See 74 Am.Jr. 2d Tender Sec. 11). Courts recognize 
H £
 . -~ or;:-} .) V 1 B 
that a tender will be valid if made conditional upon performance 
i x.i hop.bo.Lw 
of an act on the part of the creditorf where the act is a con-
tractual responsibility of the creditor. (See 74 Am.Jr. Tender 
3®' I • •.'/.-. f ir-T-V ,•....:.
 H^r.; ; 
Sec. 24) . 
i*o=..,,, •.:.••"• -i*i.-,^ ^ ! Krfs.-ipi-h"* ^ ^ p oris '*• 
All of the elements of a legal tender were met on November 
- ^ *-•• 'io xxen U B <^.n :x^;,,,.,.; _ :-..„...• 
1, 1962. 
" '' ~'-' ^^.-;^ ar, a^. f^jj. 0:j jBe^ej-rix a ;• 
In addition, PI. Ex. 2, a letter from the buyer's attorney 
-n9.*3ii:I0 .ci'j-:-: .->
 V E 0 
to Mrs. Christensen, fully meets the requirements of a written 
i ' nv e"is^ ..i. ID 
tender under Utah Code Anno. Sec. 78-27-1 (1953) which states: 
"An offer in writing to pay a particular 
9y:toe0 ex nr
 s u m 0 f money or to deliver a written in- ^ >i: en.; 
strument or specific personal property, is f 
10 vriO'Tij if
 n o t accepted, equivalent to the actual no? z-\ 
production and tender of the money, instru-
axaoxi) :•
 m e n t or property." \-r xx ^  'xxH nxiloD' 
^neaneiP T h u s tfte letter, itself, was a sufficient tender .~o".r>< 
x::r;i,x oeer T h e uniform Real Estate Contract, P. Ex. 1, contains a 
^x ^ :provision concerning the giving of a deed upon payment of the 
amount due to the grantors. This was a condition the Hansens 
could rely on in making their final payment. Paragraph No. 9 
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vxi 6avxB^ s ' l o i a i s i i ^ zrj.% rir/o£iBi "to *^Blq *d:r h^r ---~r ••*••; f-^9^ 
The testimony of the defendant (T.6) and the Findings of the 
Y ^ A W L>xi.o> . W B i 
Trial Court (R.145) paragraph 11 also show that the buyers had 
sole possession of the property for a period in excess of 16 
JUlZil&Zr 
years. The sellers cannot now come into court and assert that 
B' . anj :'c:: enaBi jt£> ei 
they actually defaulted the plaintiffs in 1962, when they have 
made no effort to take possession of the property. 
- . . *.. ^r.h ~te*wza& 
POINT III 
'0 hZ <^J>'^~f V ;,;** r/" .'-I ill'^xl ::.i.7 1 0 V CCJP.f'i 
THE SELLERS CANNOT NOW COME INTO 
COURT AND CLAIM THAT A GREATER ~ ** i£dl K 
AMOUNT WAS DUE THAN WHAT THE EVI-
iHlfl ad jf, ;^el
 D E N C E INTRODUCED AT TRIAL DEMON- ^  ttoi*? 
STRATED. 
aarf *•: ' j ' i i i ;a"isi29t2 ^/:.t Iii/3: iii; ysq-o:* >"r.^ ..P' v-*- ?••*-•, ••. --^  
At the trial of the case Mrs. Christensen was examined 
o:t . .:jri 
and her testimony was that had she accepted the amount of 
; .,; :ifc r*x;r '... •,-o 
$2,422.02 when offered her on November 1, 1962, she would have 
yn^,.i...: ^ > - ~ . I J r:-rt 
been paid in full for all principal, taxes and interest due on 
:.i isq, J 15 ~:o 
.the contract. (T.64-65) The sellers by way of a brief on appeal, 
v ; ? - u ••••.•• j . i . a r : . 
.now try to assert that the actual amount due on November 1, 1962, 
was $2,452.46. However, there was no evidence before the court 
''— -S X6 91D i: 
that such new figure was the actual amount due. 
. •. U ' I K ; ."'C- ::.' i : . r-r-" - •'< "- • • r 
The evidence is clear that sellers never objected to the 
•*voz-:-- Jq*:>... a 
amount of money, $2,422.02 in the form of a cashiers check, or 
• u :J. 
to the place of acceptance. Utah Code Anno. Sec. 78-27-3 states: 
"The person to whom a tender is made must, 
at the time, specify any objection he may 
have to the money, instrument or property, 
or he is deemed to have waived it; and, if 
the objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument or the amount or 
kind of property, he must specify the amounts ;r torn 
terms or kind which he requires, or be pre-
cluded from objection afterwards. 
The failure of the sellers to object to the amount of 
B '3 O S11 
JfI9. 
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the tender and the place of tender are therefore waived by 
3tij ^f> f$.T> i; -
law and they cannot now be heard to claim an insufficient 
. .. . .. :..'») :n:u-r.O ^ i - ? ^ 
- tender was made. 
Utah law has, also, long recognized that a party cannot 
""'!• •' **•'•%'** * r- • ? ;*/ *#"« '*t*( j y f : 
raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Where the sellers 
failed to assert the inadequacy of the tendered check in their 
answer and failed to introduce evidence they cannot raise the 
issue for the first time on appeal. See Davis v. Barrett, 24 U 
2d 162, 467 P 2d 603 (1970). . ;^ x^7—"V, ^ 
From the time the check of $2,422.02 was left at the First 
Security Bank to pay in full the Sellers1 interest there has 
~w nsEriB&- ••-'• 
never been an objection that the amount was insufficient to 
;?*%&,; VftO.H . :t£S 
cover the a unts due at that time. Even at the trial no 
evidence we presented to refute this
 : >int, and the testimony 
n o 
of all parties was to the effect that $2,422.02 would pay the 
l&sgo • •"•,*>*.*-
sellers in full. In view of the long lapse of time and in view 
% So61 "^ voM no sub 
of the fact that no dispute had previously been made as to the 
3yj.: /i5v: 
amount, it is clear that the defendants would be estopped to come 
-t^ i:t 
in on appeal and attempt to contradict an amount which had 
:}- *.o -raven h 
been accepted by both parties at the trial as being correct. 
1 a , .,;,:•....;..; -:rJ. .- . - . .'..^ & .£.%
 x * ^ °
 5
"" '• '"• -' • -
r>• •• '-
POINT IV 
:ae^£;la £ — V£ —-6V . r^ -. •-•-.-•-.••.. " soBiq scL*- oi 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
% tRam T 0 SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
*^ <vr * FINDINGS AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD ,, 
,. v^iec BE AFFIRMED. ^ -»*v,f? 
'- •* '"• -A' . */ r d oj- -betr^f r 
In this case the appellants attempt te^relate the facts 
more favorable to their position; but, there is sufficient 
" ";. • i.fn.v0s:^  •. «../ vi i v . . .. ~-~ ... 
14 
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information to support the findings and judgment of the Trial 
Court. The Trial Court's decision and judgment should not be 
areoverturned if there is sufficient evidence together with 
reasonable inferences to support the judgment* Numerous cases 
£:Lr have held that the Utah Supreme Court will view the evidence -
7 0 B 1in the light most favorable to sustain the lower court's de-
cision and the lower court's findings will not be disturbed 
unless they fairly manifest against the weight of the evidence 
or clearly indicate the Court misapplied the law to the .K 
%>;. established facts^^/r ';i;v rr^iM'.f/i r. i r '> .* , vj ";-• • riy^ IS t- : yvci? 
Utah cases stressing this point are extremely numerous. 
See First Security Bank of Utah N. A, vs. Wright,.. 521 P2d.563 , 
(1974); Howarth vs. Ostergard, 30 Utah 2d 183,515 P2d 444 (1973); 
Barrett vs. Vickers, 24 .Utah 2d 334, 471 P2d 157 (1970), -, 
JrisT"?lut The Trial Court was in a favorable position to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. His > 
decision should not be disturbed unless it is against the 
weight of the evidence. The findings of fact by the Trial 
Court (R.143-144) that the only notice of default was given 
on October 31, 1962, and that a full and complete tender was 
made on November 1, 1962, and that the tender of $2,422.02 
covered all principal, interest, and taxes up to November 1, 
1962 is clearly supported by the evidence and the court's con-
clusions of law (R. 144-146) awarding the buyers the land and 
attorneys fees are supported by the facts and by the decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
15 
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' ^:iT orb- 'io fctsmyht't baa *-jrrr2Sn;:l erte :*-Yoqq:;-* oci nol^shno'ial. 
:}i son hixod:* insiBPfoi^ ; htn CONCLUSION "iwoD Isxx*' sriT ,:iiuoD 
i Utah law recognizes that before a seller, under a Uniform 
a Real Estate Contract, can forfeit an interest or terminate a 
contract he must first give the purchaser notice of default and 
forfeiture and a reasonable amount of time to bring the contract 
current. •- Jon ',/:>» * • .iiti^ i 'a" :^u.>oo Trswc..-" arirt bn.s /.ioxaio 
:.-:H-v ., The buyers tendered payment in full on the day notice of 
default was given and the next day left a cashier's check to 
cover all payments. Collin Hansen was recognized under the law 
as one who could tender payments!^ prr.:; a &:•?•'.:!•«; fc^fio *m:H; 
idc,t;"The sellers never attempted to possess or otherwise use 
§• the land and they cannot now allege that the buyer defaulted 
the contract and the contract was terminated '^JJl^jJ^^^^ll^ 
anuju it is respectfully submitted that the decisibn and judgment 
of the Trial Court should be affirmed together with costs a-
warded to these respondents. *C/XU^&A.L \U. ;ron oLjor:^ noi™lo3b 
f
. : j r , r r / ' i^::l V i : ^ - - : / t :v -: .J • i S „..;., i "1 ^ l l .. ^ O f r e v i v e : V j ^ '? O J - f i p i ^ V J 
:is\i:C :--,v ; r l i /* ia i : *o ^ I L J O U R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 3 ^ : 0 
K;JW ^oLne:; ^>:;e.Lq>noD ci;:-» L.,J,~« ?• J'^rii bris ^KaCI ,JC *rac :»J- -'} ;io 
SO.. £ £ £ , £ ? *c -.>5bnc". ^:i'J .-r^ ' ' -rnr ' 
Walter G. Mann 
* .[ l^-1n^-7.. ,'! O:; CJi **;*/•.;.* br^: •? r:i q !" .f&' h s i s v o 
- V . O L s"^"!^.' , f c . •?&•* bc:B er:-0:?.* L' /^ * • . . - . , . , * - -• <> r 
J e f f R . T h o m e 
\:~*& b-^"/: <-.J\-( v\. e-vy^ ^r5J ^n i:!rxc.w£ (3&I-&-..' wsi TO snuAajj'Io.. 
Attorneys for p la in t i f f and 
^
l
^
i t
' -
:
'
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" '^ —
! j
 ¥'•- -> 0" ^:*v.vl ••*-'"* Respondent s 
. . j i w ^ :3«noiqc;R r!^::u or • l o 
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